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DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),I enacted in 1990,
seeks to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities 2
in the areas of employment, 3 public services, 4 public transportation,S
public accommodations, 6 and telecommunications. 7 In order to come
under the protection of the ADA, an individual must satisfy the
definition of disability developed in the statute and clarified by the
federal regulations, including those promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").8 The ADA's definition of "disability" is nearly identical to the definition of "individual
with handicaps"9 contained in the amended Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").JO Furthermore, Congress has
indicated that the relevant case law interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act should generally be applied to interpret the term disability under
the ADA.II
I.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1993).
[d. § 12101 (b).
[d. §§ 12111-12117.
[d. §§ 12131-12134.
[d. §§ 12141-12165.
[d. §§ 12181-12189.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1993).
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(1) (1993).
9. Congress' change of terminology from individual with handicaps to disability
"represents an effort ... to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted
terminology." S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). The original definition of individual with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act did not contain the third prong of the ADA
definition-"is regarded as having such an impairment." See S. REp. No.
1297. 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 37-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6388-90. In 1974 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to include this
language to "clarif[y) the intention to include those persons who are discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact
handicapped." [d. at 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389. This
subsection includes "those persons who do not in fact have the condition which
they are perceived as having. as well as those persons whose mental or physical
condition does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not
technically within [the first prong) in the new definition." [d. at 39, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389-90.
11. H.R. REp. No. 485. 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, 50 (1990). reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-66; H.R. REp. No. 485. 101st Cong., 2d. Sess., pt.
III, 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-54; S. REp. No. 116,
supra note 9 at 21; EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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To comprehend the meaning of the term disability under the
ADA, one must understand the relationship between the ADA, the
applicable regulations, and prior decisions. Consequently, section II
of this Comment first examines the ADA's definition of disability
and the relevant EEOC regulations. Second, section III discusses the
relationship between the ADA's definition of disability and the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of individual with handicaps. Third,
section IV reviews the Rehabilitation Act decisions. Finally, section
V analyzes the ADA's definition against the background of the EEOC
regulations and the Rehabilitation Act decisions.
.
II.

THE ADA'S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY

Historically, society has isolated and segregated individuals with
disabilities. Discrimination still persists in "critical areas, such as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting and access to public services." 12 The ADA was enacted
to eliminate these types of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. 13
In order to come under the protection of the ADA, an individual
must first demonstrate that he has a disability. 14 The ADA's definition
of disability consists of three prongs: "(A) [A] physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such impairment. "IS The term disability
also includes "a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV)."16 The ADA, however, specifically excludes certain
conditions from the definition of disability, 17 including transvestism, 18
current illegal drug use,19 homosexuality, and bisexuality.20

12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1993).
13. [d. § 12101(b).
.
14. [d. § 12112(a). Title I provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual." [d.
15. [d. § 12102(2). The ADA's three prong test is based upon the three prong test
as defined in the Rehabilitation Act. See infra part III.
16. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 334. Congress explained that a person infected with HIV is covered under
the first prong of the definition of the term disability because of the substantial
limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships that exists as a result
of being infected with HIV. [d.
17. Disability does not include "(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identification disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; (2) compulsive gambling,
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Title I of the ADA requires that the EEOC issue substantive
regulations to implement the employment section of the ADA.21
Among other objectives, the Title I regulations seek to clarify the
meaning of disability, by defining terms of art used in the statute,
such as "physical or mental impairment, "22 "major life activities, "23
"substantially limits,"24 "has a record of such impairment,"2S and
"is regarded as having such an impairment. "26

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

kleptomania, or pyromania; or (3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting
from current illegal use of drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b).
[d. § 12208.
[d. §§ 12114, 12210.
[d. § 12211(a).
[d. § 12116.
The EEOC has defined physical or mental impairment as
I) any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
According to the EEOC, major life actIvItIes include "[c]aring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
include within this term "those basic activities that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty," and it warns that
the above list is not exhaustive. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,741 (1991). Other
major life activities include sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(i).
Title I regulations define substantially limits as being
(1) ... (i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). According to the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, the
identification of whether a physical or mental impairment exists is only the
first step in determining whether or not an individual is disabled. 56 Fed. Reg.
35,726, 35,741. Only if the impairment rises to the level of the disability, can
the impairment be said to substantially· limit one or more of the individual's
major life activities. [d.
Under Title I regulations, has a record of such impairment means that an
individual "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that siIbstantially limits one or more major life activities."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
The phrase is regarded as having such an impairment means that an individual
(1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as consti-
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The regulations also pn;>vide a list of factors to be considered
in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity. 27 Of particular concern during the rulemaking
process was the inclusion of the term "working" as one of the major
life activities. 28
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT'S DEFINITION OF
INDIVIDUAL WITH HANDICAPS
The Rehabilitation Act was enacted, in part, "to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their
need for, or ability to benefit from vocational services, in relation
to federal financial assistance in the areas of employment, housing,
transportation, education, health services, or any other [f]ederallyaided programs. "29 Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act employs
the term of art, individual with handicaps.3o Individual with handicaps
is defined as any person "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded
as having such an impairment. "31 As a comparison between the
definitions of individual with handicaps and disability indicates, the

27.

28.

29.
30.
31.

tuting such limitation;
(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
(3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(I) or (2)
of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
Factors to be considered in deciding if an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity include "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent
or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2).
56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991). To alleviate concerns associated with the inclusion
of "working," the EEOC provided the following definition:
With respect to the major life activity of working - (i) The term
substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs of a broad range or jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3).
S. REp. No. 1297, supra note 10, at 37, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6388.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1988).
[d.
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Rehabilitation Act is the model upon which the ADA's definition is
based.32
IV. FURTHER DEFINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA: A
REVIEW OF THE REHABILITATION ACT DECISIONS
Following the passage of the Rehabilitation Act, extensive litigation occurred over the meaning of individual with handicaps. As
the federal courts resolved these various cases, their resulting decisions
slowly created a more comprehensive definition of individual· with
handicaps. As a result, federal courts, heeding Congress' directive to
apply the Rehabilitation Act decisions to ADA cases,33 have a more
comprehensive framework within which to operate. More significantly, however, is the impact this comprehensiveness will have as
the courts interpret the ADA's definition of disability. As the courts
rely upon the Rehabilitation Act decisions, the more likely it is that
future ADA decisions will develop uniformly with less controversy
over what type of conditions qualify as disabilities. A review of the
Rehabilitation Act decisions is, therefore, important.

A.

The Leading Decisions

Three leading federal cases, analyzing the term handicapped
individual under the Rehabilitation Act, include School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline,34 E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 35 and
Jasany v. United States Postal Service. 36 In Arline, the United States
Supreme Court held that a teacher, who suffered from a susceptibility
to tuberculosis, could be classified as a handicapped person within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 37 Arline suffered tuberculosis
in such an acute form that it affected her respiratory system and
necessitated her being hospitalized. 38 Working with the first prong of
the definition and the regulations, the Court determined that Arline
had a physical impairment. 39 According to the Court, because Arline
had been hospitalized for tuberculosis, she could be considered a
handicapped individual under the second prong of the definition since
she had a record of impairment.40
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline. 480 U.S. 273. 289 (1987).
38. [d. at 281.

39. [d.
40. [d.

(l
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In an attempt to justify the discriminatory treatment, the School
Board argued that tuberculosis is a contagious disease. 41 The Court,
however, rejected this line of reasoning. 42 The Court emphasized that
"[a]llowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a
physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
[the Rehabilitation Act]. "43
.
The seminal case of E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshalf44 delineated
the factors-which must be satisfied in order to find that an individual
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Crosby,
a union member, sustained back injuries on the job. 4s Subsequently,
he was referred by the union to E. E. Black, 'Ltd., a general
construction contractor ("the contractor"), which required all apprentice carpenters to undergo a pre-employment physical examination. 46 The examination revealed "a congenital back anomaly. "47
Based upon this examination, the contractor refused to hire Crosby.48
A second physical examination was conducted and revealed additional
back injuries, specifically a "spina bifida occulta and a mild rotoscoliosis. "49 The second examining physician concluded that these
injuries did not prevent Crosby from performing the job of apprentice
carpenter. so Crosby, however, was never hired by the contractor for
an apprentice carpenter position. sl
The E. E. Black court focused upon all three prongs of the
Rehabilitation Act's handicapped definition.s2 The court emphasized
that the third prong of the definition "refers to those individuals
who are perceived as having a handicap, whether an impairment
41. [d.
42. [d. at 282.
43. [d. at 284. The ADA, however, lists as an employer defense that "[t]he term
'qualification standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U .S.C. § 12113(b) (1993). Furthermore, individuals who have an
infectious or communicable disease which cannot be reasonably accommodated
may be refused assignment to a job involving food handling. [d. § 121 I3(d)(2).
For a list of infectious and communicable diseases which are transmitted
through 'the handling of the food supply see id. § 121 I3(d)(1).
44. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
45. [d. at 1091.
46. [d.
47. [d.
48. [d.
49. [d. "Spina bifida occulta is an anomaly characterized by the defective closure
of the bony encasement of the spinal cord. Rotoscoliosis is an anomaly which
involves a narrowing of the disc space caused by a slight rotation of the
spine." [d. n.l.
50. [d. at 1091-92.
51. [d. at 1092.
52. [d. at 1097.
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exists or not, but who, because of attitudes or for any other reason,
are regarded as handicapped by employers. "53 Regarding the second
prong, the court stated that a "handicapped individual is 'substantially limited' if he or she is likely to experience difficulty in securing,
retaining or advancing in employment because of a handicap."S4 The
court then noted that the definitions contained in the Rehabilitation
Act are "personal and must be evaluated by looking at the particular
individual .... It is the impaired individual that must be examined,
and not just the impairment in the abstract. "55 Although an examining physician had concluded that Crosby's back injuries did not
prevent him from performing the job's duties, the contractor perceived Crosby as being handicapped. 56 Therefore, the court held that
Crosby was a handicapped individual under the third prong of the
.
definition. 57
The importance of Jasany v. United States Postal Service58 stems
from its analysis rather than from its holding that the physical
impairment of crossed eyes did not substantially limit a major life
activity. 59 In Jasany, a distribution clerk trainee, who was born with
a mild case of strabismus, commonly known as crossed eyes, was
discharged by the United States Postal Service ("USPS").60 During
a ninety-day probationary period, Jasany developed eye strain, headaches, and excess tearing. 61 However, both prior to and after being
discharged by the USPS, Jasany was able to fully participate in
"school, work, sports, and recreational activities, as well as all other
normal daily activities of every kind whatsoever without limitation."62
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had "erred as a
matter of law in finding that [Jasany] was a handicapped person
within the meaning of [the Re·habilitation Act]. "63 Although the court
found that Jasany had a physical or mental impairment,64 this impairment did not have any effect on any of his other activities,

Id. at 1097 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, app. A (1993» (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 1099 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1993».
Id. at 1099.
/d. at 1101-02.
Id. at 1102. For a more thorough analysis of this case see Andrew W. Haines,
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped
Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 527 (1983).
58. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 1250.
60. Id. at 1247.
61. Id.
62.ld.
63. Id. at 1250.
64. Id. at 1248.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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including past jobs or other duties he performed at the USPS.65

B.

Other Federal Court Decisions

1.

Musculoskeletal Disabilities or Impairments

The lower federal courts have analyzed whether musculoskeletal
disabilities or impairments meet the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of handicapped with varying results. The United States District Court
. for the Southern District of New York held that a dislocated shoulder
was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act in Mahoney v. Ortiz. 66
In Mahoney, a police officer applicant had suffered four or five
shoulder dislocations prior to taking the New York City Police
Department written exam. 67 After being considered ineligible to become a police officer because of the prior dislocations, he brought
suit under the Rehabilitation Act. 68
Quoting the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicapped
individual, the court held that the applicant was a handicapped
individual under .the second and third prongs. 69 Basing its holding
on the applicant's potential for "total incapacitation," the court
reasoned that nearly total incapacitation is a "limitation on one or
more of [the applicant's] major life activities. "70 According to the
court, the applicant had established a prima facie case under the
Rehabilitation Act.71
Persons impaired because of spinal· deformities, amputation, and
dwarfism have also been considered handicapped individuals within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. In Thornhill v. Marsh,72
Thornhill, an employee of the Army Corps of Engineers, ("Corps")
was discharged after a physical examination revealed that he had a
congenital spinal deformity, preventing him from lifting more than
fifty pounds. 73 The Corps refused to rehire Thornhill even after
Thornhill's and the Corps~ examining physicians concluded that the
deformity did not limit his lifting capacity.74
Focusing on the third prong of the handicapped definition, the
court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

[d. at 1250.
645 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
[d. at 23.

[d.
[d. at 24.
[d.
71. [d.

72. 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
73. [d. at 1183.
74. [d.
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Thornhill was a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act. 7S
The court based its reasoning on the Corps' misplaced perception
that Thornhill's spinal deformity prevented him from performing his
duties. 76
In Longoria v. Harris,77 the parties did not dispute that an
individual who had his right leg amputated below the kneecap was
a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. 78
Similarly, in Dexler v. Tisch,79 the government stipulated that a
USPS applicant with achondroplastic dwarfism, who was denied
employment as a distribution clerk, was handicapped within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.so The significance of Longoria
and Dexler stems from their addition of two disorders that can be
considered as falling under the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
hat:J,dicapped.
Inconsistency, however, has occurred when the federal courts
have considered whether back injuries and deformities satisfy the
Rehabilitation Act's definition. In Perez v. Philadelphia Housing
AuthoritY,81 a Pennsylvania State employee was discharged after
having suffered back and leg injuries on the job. 82 Citing both the
Rehabilitation Act and the Department of Health and Human Services regulations, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania emphasized that determining who is a handicapped person depends on a case-by-case analysis of the facts.83 The
court then held that Perez had a physical impairment that substantially limited her activities.84 The court based its holding on Perez'
testimony that her back problems caused her considerable pain,
affecting not only her work, "but also her ability to walk, sit, stand,
drive, care for her home and child, and engage in leisure pastimes. "8S
Therefore, the court concluded that Perez was a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 86

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1184.
77. 554 F. Supp. 102 (s.b. Tex. 1982).
78. Id. at 102-03.
79. 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
80. Id. at 1425. "Achondroplastic dwarfism is a growth disorder that affects all
four extremities and results in short limbs and short stature." Id. at 1419. As .
a result of this condition, Dexler was four feet, five inches tall and had.a
vertical reach of 58 112 inches. Id. Furthermore, his horizontal reach was well
below normal. Id.
81. 677 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1987), ajj'd, 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988) ..
82. Id. at 359.
83. Jd. at 360.
84.Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 360-61.
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In Coley v. Secretary oj the Army,87 Coley, a civilian employee'
of the United States Army, filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act
when he was denied reinstatement, following a short term disability
period that involved a chronic back problem. 88 Coley's medical report
prevented him from lifting or carrying objects in excess of fifteen
pounds. 89 Furthermore, Coley could not work in excessive cold or
dampness nor could he perform manual labor. 90
Operating under the first prong of the definition, the court held
that Coley was a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act
because he had a physical impairment which substantially limited the
major life activity of working. 91 The court found that Coley's "physical handicap was a significant barrier to his employment" because
"[h]e was disqualified from all jobs requiring any degree of manual
labor."92 Therefore, according to the court, his "physical disability
was a substantial limitation on his ability to work. "93
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California, in Diaz v. United States Postal Service,94 considered the
situation where a USPS employee, Diaz, who had suffered a lumbosacral strain of his back during the Vietnam War, experienced an
additional back injury on the job. 9s Following his post-injury return
to the job, Diaz was incapable of performing all the duties required
of an USPS carrier, including lifting mail bags weighing up to seventy
pounds. 96 After being discharged, Diaz brought suit, alleging that the
USPS's discrimination against his handicap violated the Rehabilitation Act. 97
In its opinion, the court focused upon the term major life
activities. 98 Through reference to the regulations, the court defined
major life activities to include "functions, such as caring for one's'
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."99 The court then held that the
impairment had not substantially limited Diaz's major life activities
since only seven of his sixteen absences had been caused by back87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

689 F. Supp. 519 (D. Md. 1987).
[d. at 520.
[d. at 520-21.
[d. at 521.
[d.
[d.
[d.
658 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
[d. at 488.

96.
97.
98.
99.

[d.
[d. at 491.
[d.
[d. at 491 (quoting Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248

(6th Cir. 1985».
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related problems. loo The court further bolstered its holding with the
observation that Diaz had been able to perform his regular duties
upon his return to the job. lol
Knee injuries have not been found to place an individual under
the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. In Elstner v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. ,102 Elstner, a telephone company employee, whose
duties included pole tree climbing, originally injured his knee at a
softball game, and then after recovering, reinjured the same knee on
the job. 103 Elstner underwent corrective knee surgery on several
occasions. I04 Although after the initial surgery Elstner was able to
resume his normal duties, successive operations prevented him from
performing those duties. 10$ When Elstner applied for a hardship
transfer,l06 he was transferred to a lower paying position.107 Elstner
then brought suit claiming handicap discrimination. lOS The basis of
Elstner's handicap discrimination claim was the company's Affirmative Action Plan,l09 which employed the Rehabilitation Act's regulations' definition of a handicapped individual. lIo
The court held that Elstner was not a handicapped individual
merely because he was unable to perform a single job. 11I According
to the court, Elstner did not fit within the Rehabilitation Act's
definition because he was not a handicapped individual. 1I2
In Alderson v. Postmaster General,1I3 Alderson, a USPS carrier,
injured his knee after being chased by a dog. 1I4 After undergoing
physical therapy, the treating physician concluded that Alderson's
knee had regained full motion, and therefore, allowed Alderson to
resume his daily work duties. lI $ Once Alderson was dismissed because
of his alleged slowness in delivering mail, he brought suit under the
Rehabilitation Act. 116
In its opinion, the court stated that the treating physician's
findings did not support the assertion that Alderson was handicapped
1993)

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

[d. at 491-92.
[d.
659 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1987),
[d. at 1332.
[d. at 1332-33.
[d.
[d. at 1333.
[d. at 1331.
[d.
[d. at 1341 n.l.
[d. at 1341 n.2.
[d. at 1343.
[d.
598 F. Supp. 49 (W.O. Okla. 1984).
[d. at 51-52.
[d. at 52.
[d. at 50.

aiI'd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988).
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for any period of time.1I7 Furthermore, the court held that there was
no evidence that the USPS ever regarded Alderson as handicapped, llS
thereby removing Alderson from inclusion under the third prong of
the Rehabilitation Act's definition.
Other conditions, such as left-handedness and body weight, have
not been considered disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. In de
la Torres v. Bolger,ll9 de la Torres, a left-handed USPS carrier was
dismissed from the USPS because of unsatisfactory slowness in
delivering the mail. I20 De la Torres brought suit against the USPS
alleging handicap discrimination. 121 The Fifth Circuit determined that
de la Torres did not satisfy the firsi element of the definition of an
individual with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act: 122 Being lefthanded was "a physical characteristic, not a chronic illness, a disorder
or deformity, a mental disability, or a condition affecting [de la
Torres's] health."I23
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California reached a similar result in Tudyman v. United Airlines. l24
Tudyman, a male bodybuilder, applied for a position as a flight
attendant with United Airlines and was subsequently denied employment. 125 At the time of his application, Tudyman weighed 178
pounds. 126 United Airlines required that flight attendants with Tudyman's height of five foot, seven inches, weigh no more than 163
pounds. 127 Tudyman filed suit against. . United Airlines claiming handicap discrimination,128
The court held that Tudyman was not a handicapped individual
under the Rehabilitation ACt because he failed to satisfy any of the
definition's elements. 129 The court stated that Tudyman was not
physically impaired because his unique body composition was selfimposed and voluntary,l3o Nor, according to the court, did his body

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d. at 53.
[d.
781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
[d. at 1135.
[d.
[d. at 1137.
[d. at 1138.
608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal,. 1984).
[d. at 740.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 743-47.
[d. at 746. The court distinguished a "voluntary" weight gain from an
"involuntary" weight gain such as one caused by a glandular problem. [d.
Therefore, the court implied that an "involuntary" weight gain might bring
an individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. [d.
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weight limit the major life activity of working; he was only prevented
from working as a flight attendant. 131 Finally, the court noted that
United Airlines neither perceived nor regarded Tudyman as a handiCapped individual. 132
These federal decisions appear to indicate that persons afflicted
with certain musculoskeletal impairments like· shoulder dislocations,
spinal deformities, amputation, and dwarfism will be considered
handicapped, while those persons dealing with knee injuries, lefthandedness or body weight problems will not be considered handicapped. The most acute conflict among the federal courts occurs
where the impairment is related to an injury. or deformity afflicting
a person's back. Generally, where the impairment to the back is
severe, the federal courts will likely consider that condition to be
handicapping in nature.
2.

Sensory Function Disabilities or Impairments
Generally, the courts have held that deaf individuals meet the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handicaps.133 Similarly, individuals who are blind or legally blind have been found to
satisfy the Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handicaps.l34 Likewise, .individuals, having vision in only one eye, have
also been considered individuals with handicaps.13s
131. [d.

132. [d.
133. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983)

(finding that a school bus driver, who wore a hearing aid, was a handicapped
individual); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding
that a USPS employee, who had been completely deaf since birth, was a
handicapped individual); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F.
Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (finding that a nursing school applicant,
who had a moderately severe hearing loss in the right ear and a severe hearing
loss in the left ear, was a handicapped individual).
134. See Sharon v. Larson, 650 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that
an applicant for a learner's permit, whose corrected vision in the right and
left eyes was 20/120 and 20/300, respectively, was a handicapped individual);
Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533, 536 (W.O. Ark. 1983) (finding that an
applicant for a librarian position, whose corrected vision in the right eye was
only 20/200 and whose left eye vision was unmeasurable, was a handicapped
individual), a/I'd, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411
F. Supp. 982, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding that an applicant for a teaching
position, who was blind since the age of 12, was a handicapped individual),
a/I'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 932 (1981).
135. See Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 n.7 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that
two junior high school students, who each had vision in only one eye, fell
under the Rehabilitation Act's definition of individuals with handicaps); Wright
v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding that a
university student, possessing vision in only one eye, was a handicapped
individual).
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A more extensive analysis, however, must be conducted if the
vision impairment does not rise to the level of total blindness in at
least one eye. For example, in Padilla v. City oj Topeka,136 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that a police officer applicant, having
an uncorrected vision of 20150 in each eye but a corrected vision of
20/20,137 was not a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation
Act. 138 Although the court found that Padilla did possess a physical
impairment, it stated that this impairment did not limit any of his
life activities. 139
Conversely, in Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Education
Agency,l40 an applicant for a teaching position had mUltiple handicaps, including nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia and left side hemiplegia
due to cerebral palsy. 141 Because of the dyslexia, Fitzgerald was only
able to read between a third and sixth grade level. I42 After the
educational agency refused to hire him, Fitzgerald brought suit under
the Rehabilitation Act.143 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa held that Fitzgerald was a handicapped
individual under the Rehabilitation Act. l44 Based upon these federal
decisions, one can conclude that a person with sensory impairment,
which cannot be adequately corrected, will likely be considered a
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act.
3.

Cardiovascular and Circulatory Disabilities or Impairments

Within the federal district courts, cardiovascular and circulatory
impairments have been considered handicapping conditions subjecting
individuals to the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. In Bey v.
Bolger,14S Bey, who had applied for a position as a distribution clerk
with the USPS, was diagnosed as suffering from hypertension, cardiac
enlargement, and an abnormal EKG.I46 Because of these conditions,
the USPS refused to hire him.147 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Bey was a
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.

708 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1985).
[d. at 545.
[d. at 550.
[d.
589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
[d. at 1132.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1135-36. See a/so Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 668 (lith Cir. 1983)
(holding that an individual, who had been diagnosed as dyslexic, was a
handicapped individual).
540 F. Supp. 910 (B.D. Pa. 1982).
[d. at 920.
[d. at 913.
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handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act
because (1) he had a "record of a physical impairment, cardiovascular
disease;" and (2) the USPS "regarded him as handicapped because
of his continuing uncontrolled blood pressure, cardiac enlargement
and abnormal electrocardiogram." 148
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, in Carty v. Carlin,149 considered a situation where the
USPS had taken discriminatory measures. Carty, a postal employee,
was discharged from employment as a custodian by the USPS, after
suffering a heart attack and being hospitalized for severe depression. lSo
Focusing on the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act's definition,
the court examined several factors to determine if an impairment is
so severe as to substantially limit employment potential. The factors
to be considered include "the number and type of jobs from which
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which
the individual has a reasonable access, and the individual's job
expectations and training. "lSI
Applying these three factors, the court found that Carty had
not demonstrated that the position of custodian was the only one he
was incapable of performing. ls2
The court then focused on the second prong of the definition
and determined Carty had a physical and mental impairmentlS3 based
on Carty's record of medical and psychiatric treatment. lS4 Therefore,
the court held that it could not state that Carty did not meet the
definition of a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act.1SS
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
analyzed the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handiCapped individual in Bento v. I. T. O. Corp. of Rhode Island. ls6 Bento, a longshoreman, suffered a back injury at work.ls7 While receiving workers' .
compensation benefits, he suffered chest pains which precipitated an
emergency room visit. IS8 After admittance to the hospital, it was
discovered that he had only two major coronary arteries instead of
the normal three. IS9 Open heart surgery was successfully performed,
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

[d. at 927.
623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985).
[d. at 1183.
[d. at 1185.
[d.
[d. at 1184.
[d.
[d. at 1185.
599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.!. 1984).
[d. at 733.
[d. at 734.
[d.
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and Bento received disability benefits for the next two years. l60
Although eager to return to work, Bento was denied employment by
. the defendant, I.T.O. Corporation.l 61 Relying upon the language of
the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that Bento was a handicapped
person 162 because he suffered from a "documented physical impairment which substantially limit[ed] some of his major life activities. "163
Minor to moderate circulatory impairments have not been afforded the protection of the Rehabilitation Act by the Eighth Circuit.
In Oesterling v. Waiters,l64 Oesterling, a Veterans Administration
clerk/typist, was reassigned to a mailclerk position. 16s Oesterling
objected to this reassignment on the ground that leg problems associated with varicose veins would prevent her from standing or
walking for long periods of time. 166 After her application for disability
retirement was denied, Oesterling filed suit alleging a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. 167
.
The Eighth Circuit viewed the question of whether a person is
a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act as one of fact. l68 The court compared Oesterling's facts against
the first prong of the definition. 169 Although the court found that
she had a physical impairment from varicose veins, her condition
had been diagnosed as mild to moderate. 17o The court concluded the
major life activities of standing and sitting were not substantially
limited as a result of this impairment. 171 Therefore, the court held
that Oesterling was not a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. 172
4.

Other Physical Impairments

When an individual suffers from a kidney impairment, whether
as the sole disabling condition or in conjunction with other ailments,
the courts have found that the individual is handicapped within the
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

[d.
[d. at 735-36.
[d. at 741.

[d. See also Cook v. United States Dep't of Labor, 688 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1982) (finding that the plaintiff, who suffered from angina, was a handicapped
individual because he was regarded as having an impairment which substantially
limited his life activities), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983).
760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985).
[d. at 860.
[d. at 860-61.
[d. at 860.
[d. at 861.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169. [d.
170. [d.
171. [d.
172. [d.
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meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 173 Additionally, the courts have
generally held that individuals who suffer from diabetes are handicapped individuals under the Rehabilitation Act. 114
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration,11S a government employee, Vickers, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming
he was a handicapped person because he was sensitive to tobacco
smoke. 116 The court found that Vickers had a physical impairment
which substantially limited one or more of his major life activities,
in particular his capacity to work in an environment which was not
completely smoke free. 111 Therefore, the court held that Vickers was
a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 118
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia declined to find an Army employee handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act in Stevens v. Stubbs. 119 Stevens was
downgraded from a vehicle operations manager position to a warehouseman. lso Stevens brought suit on several grounds, alleging in one
count. that he was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. 181
Although Stevens had taken extensive leaves of absence,182 he failed
to present any evidence of a specific "physical or mental impairment
which substantially limit[ed] one or more of his major life activities."183 According to the court, the only evidence that Stevens
produced was an "undisclosed transitory illness." 184 Furthermore, the
court did not accept Stevens' argument that he was regarded by his
employer as having an impairment since the record was totally devoid
of any such evidence. 18s Therefore, since Stevens could not ~stablish
he suffered from any physical or mental impairment, or that he was
regarded by his employer as having an impairment, the court held
173. See Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 425 (E.D. Pa.

174.

175.
176.
177.
178.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

1982) (concluding that a high school student, who had a kidney removed, was
a handicapped individual); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F.
Supp. 948, 953 (D.N.J. 1980) (concluding that a high school student, who was
born with one kidney, was considered a handicapped individual).
See, e.g., Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y.)
(finding that an applicant for a sanitation worker position, who was medically
disqualified because he suffered from diabetes mellitus, was handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act), aJJ'd, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989).
549 F. Supp. 85 (W.O. Wash. 1982).
[d. at 87-88.
[d. at 86-87.
[d. at 86.
576 F.Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
[d. at 1410.
[d. at 1413.
[d.
[d. at 1414.
[d.
[d.
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that he was not a handicapped person within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. 186
5.

Neurological Disorders

The courts have consistently found epilepsy to be a disability, 187
even in situations where the individual has not suffered an epileptic
attack for a long time. 188 For example, in Duran v. City of Tampa, 189
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
determined 'that a police applicant satisfied the third prong of the
definition of handicapped,19O although he did not experience any
grand or petit mal seizures for fifteen years or take medication for
ten years. 191
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Brock,l92 a former government employee, suffering from epileptic seizures, was considered a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation ACt. 193 The court based
its holding on the first prong of the definition.l94 The court determined that Reynolds' epilepsy substantially limited her ability to
work because both "federal and state regulations and policies restrict[edj the types of jobs available to her. "195 For example, many
states prohibit epileptics from obtaining driver's licenses unless they
have not suffered a seizure for a specific length of time. l96 The court
found that this inability to drive to work severely limited job opportunities for epileptics and, therefore, held in Reynolds' favor .197
186. [d. at 1415.
187. See Salmon Pineiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483,490 (D.P.R. 1987) (finding
that plaintiff suffered a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act because of
extensive history of "convulsive episodes"); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area
Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Iowa 1984) ("[P]laintiff has
nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia and cerebral palsy with left side hemiplegia. There
appears to be no dispute that plaintiff is a 'handicapped individual."'); Drennon
v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("That
persons with epilepsy are considered handicapped is too self-evident to be
contested. ").
188. This view is consistent with the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines which state that
"an individual with epilepsy would be considered to have an impairment even
. if the symptoms of the disorder were completely controlled by medicine." 56
Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991).
189. 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
190. [d. at 78.
191. [d. at 76.
192. 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987).
193. [d. at 574.
194. [d. at 573-74.
195. [d. at 574.
196. [d.
197. [d.
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Cerebral palsy, on the other hand, has not met with much
success in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio.J98 In Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Society,l99 Pridemore
was denied employment as an attorney. 200 Analyzing the facts based
upon all three prongs of the Rehabilitation Act's definition, the court
held that Pridemore could not establish a prima facie case of handicap
discrimination. 201 According to the court, the impact of cerebral palsy
caused Pridemore to have poor control over his ocular muscles,
thereby limiting his ability to read and to sustain eye contact. 202
Furthermore, Pridemore suffered from speech defects, although his
speech could be understood by listeners. 203
The court concluded that Pridemore was not a handicapped
individual under the Rehabilitation Act because the cerebral palsy
did not substantially limit any of Pridemore's major life activities. 204
Further, Pridemore did not have a record of an impairment because
his cerebral palsy was diagnosed after he had applied for the job. 20S
Finally, the court found Pridemore did not create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the third prong of the definition 206 because
he did not mention he had cerebral palsy during the interview
process.207
With respect to individuals diagnosed with mUltiple sclerosis,
courts have generally found that these individuals are handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act. 208 For example, in Carter v. Casa
Central,209 a director of nursing was dismissed after being diagnosed
with multiple sclerosis. 2lO The defendant conceded at trial that Carter
was a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act.2I1
198. Contra Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. lBO,
1132 (S;D. Iowa 1984) (finding that a school teacher, whose most apparent
handicap was left side hemiplegia due to cerebral palsy, was a handicapped
individual).
199. 625 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
200. [d. at 1182.
201. [d. at 1185.
202. [d. at 1183.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 1184.
205. [d.
206. [d. at 1185.
207. [d. at 1184.
208. "Multiple sclerosis is a disease that affects the central nervous system, that is
the brain and spinal cord." Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.l
(7th Cir. 1988). This condition can cause individuals to be totally incapacitated,
or cause only intermittent periods of weakness, or other neurological loss of
function. [d.
209. 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988).
210. [d. at 1054.
211. [d. at 1051. Accord Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F .2d 1372,
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Respiratory Ailments

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has addressed the relationship between respiratory ailments and individuals with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act. 212
In Fynes v. Weinberger,213 the court concluded that two navy yard
employees, who suffered from asbestosis or asbestos-related diseases,
were handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.214
7.

Contagious Diseases

In addition to the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, other
courts have held that an individual suffering from a contagious
disease is a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. For
instance, in Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center,21S the court held
that an applicant, seeking admission into the Woodhaven Learning
Center, and who was diagnosed as being an active carrier of Hepatitis
B,216 was a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 217 The court focused on the third. prong of the
definition and determined· that Kohl was "regarded as having a
physical impairment" as a result of carrying Hepatitis B.218 According
to the court, the denial of admission to Kohl by Woodhaven Learning
Center and Woodhaven School limited one of Kohl's major life
activities.219 The court then stated that this denial was primarily a
result of the belief by both facilities that Kohl's condition posed a

212.
213.
214.

215.

216.
217.
218.
219.

1376 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that a medical doctor, who suffered from
multiple sclerosis, was confined to a wheelchair, and had difficulty writing,
was a handicapped person).
Fynes v. Weinberger, 677 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
677 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Id. at 321; see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
672 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D"Mo. 1987), rev'd, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 V.S. 892 (1989). The Eighth Circuit accepted the district court's
finding that Kohl was handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 935 (8th Cir.) , cert.
denied, 493 V.S. 892 (1989). The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's application of the Arline test in two ways. Id. at 937.
First, the district court commingled the two parts of the test, analyzing
• the nature of the risk to others only after assuming its recommended
accommodations were in place. Second, the district court paid unwarranted deference to the opinion of a particular health official as
to what accommodations were reasonable.
Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court order granting injunctive and
declaratory relief to Kohl. Id. at 941.
Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 672 F. Supp. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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threat to third persons within the facility.220 Under this third prong,
the court had little difficulty finding that Kohl was a handicapped
individual. 221
By expressly stating that individuals that are HIV positive are
included within the meaning of disability under the ADA,222 Congress
left no room for judicial decision-making in this area. Nevertheless,
under the Rehabilitation Act, the courts generally have held that
persons with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
were handicapped individuals. 223
8.

Mental or Psychological Disorders or Impairments

The courts have generally held that individuals who are mentally
retarded are handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act. 224 Other more subtle mental or psychological disorders/impairments have not resulted in the same unanimity in the courts. The
Second and Fifth Circuits, as well as the United States District Courts
for the District of Columbia, the Southern District of Ohio, and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, have found that mental and/or
physical disorders are encompassed by the Rehabilitation Act's definition. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has declined to hold that the
psychological disorder of acrophobia falls within the meaning of
handicapped individual as used in the statute.
In Doe v. New York University,22S the Second Circuit decided if
a medical student, who suffered from psychiatric and mental disorders, was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act.226 Doe was
diagnosed as having a borderline personality disorder. 227 Her behavior
220.
221.
222.
223.

224.

225.
226.
227.

[d.
[d.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002,
1007 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding that a child, who suffered from hemophilia
B and was diagnosed as having an AIDS-related complex, was a handicapped
individual); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that a five year old boy infected with the AIDS virus
was a handicapped individual); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of
Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding that children with
AIDS are handicapped individuals).
See Flowers v. Webb, 575 F. Supp. 1450, 1456 (B.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that
a 19 year old mentally retarded girl, who brought suit against the State
Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities, had demonstrated that she was handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act).
666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
-[d. at 774-75.
[d. at 768. A personality disorder is a serious condition which manifests itself
by a series of five or more recognizable characteristics. [d. The court reasoned

[Vol. 22
Baltimore Law Review
378
consisted of numerous self-destructive acts as well as attacks upon
other individuals.228 These attacks were followed by both psychological treatments and admissions to various psychiatric hospitals. 229 The
court concluded that Doe should be classified as a handicapped
person under the Rehabilitation Act230 because of her extensive history
of mental impairments requiring hospitalizations. 231 According to the
court, this history indicated that Doe suffered from a substantial
limitation on a major life activity-"the ability to handle stressful
situations of the type faced in a medical training milieu. "232 Furthermore, "New York University's refusal to readmit her on the
ground that she posed an unacceptable risk to faculty, students, and
patients made it clear that she was to be regarded as having such an
impairment. "233
The Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Commission,234 considered the situation where a psychiatric worker brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act after her
employment was terminated.23S Doe had been diagnosed as suffering
from a "depressive neurosis. "236 Additionally she suffered from
chronic insomnia and serious depression. 237 Her illness became so
acute that she had to be hospitalized several times. 238 After her release
from the hospital, she continued psychiatric treatment. 239 Shortly
after expressing a wish to commit suicide, her employer discovered
her medical history and terminated her employment. 240 The court,
therefore, concluded that a mental handicap, such as that claimed
by Doe, qualified under the Rehabilitation Act.241

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

as follows:
A person suffering from this type of disorder is likely to have it
continue throughout most of his or her adult life, subject to modification only by treatment by well-trained therapists over a period of
years and adoption of a iifestyle which avoids situations that subject
the person to types of stress with which he or she cannot cope.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id..
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id.
704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1407.
Id. at 1404.
Id.
Id. at 1405.
Id.
Id. at 1406-07.
Id. at 1408.
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Similarly, in Matzo v. Postmaster General,242 a secretary, Matzo,
employed by the USPS, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act
when her employment was terminated because of repeated absences. 243
Matzo claimed she was a handicapped person because she was a
manic depressive. 244 She suffered' from emotional problems and her
behavior at work was erratic, disruptive, and insubordinate. 245 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that
although the USPS had not disputed that Matzo's mental condition
qualified her as a handicapped person within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act,246 the USPS had proved that Matzo was not
"otherwise qualified," and that the USPS had made reasonable
accommodations.247
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio confronted similar discrimination by the USPS in Franklin v.
United States Postal Service.248 Franklin, an USPS employee, was
terminated and subsequently brought suit under the Rehabilitation
Act.249 Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was frequently hospitalized for this illness. 250 Working under the first prong
of the definition, the court determined that Franklin's condition
"may place [Franklin] in the handicapped category."251
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania also considered schizophrenic reactions in light of the
Rehabilitation Act in Doe v. Colautti.252 Doe, an inmate in a private
psychiatric hospital, brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. 253 Doe
was referred to the Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital following a
suicide attempt,254 and was diagnosed as suffering from a "schizoaffective reaction. "255 The court held that the "plaintiff unquestionably
[was] a 'handicapped individual' within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act]. "256
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit found that an individual suffering
from acrophobia fell outside of the Rehabilitation Act's protection.
1993]

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

685 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1987), a/I'd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
[d. at 261.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 262 n.4.
[d. at 264.
687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
[d. at 1215-16.
[d. at 1216.
[d. at 1218.
454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a/I'd, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
[d. at 624.
.
[d. at 625.
[d.
[d. at 626.
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In Forrisi v. Bowen,2S7 Forrisi was hired by the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS") as a utility systems repairer and
operator. 258 The job description required Forrisi to climb stairways
and ladders both for emergencies and for routine maintenance. 259
Because Forrisi suffered from acrophobia, he was unable to climb
to certain heights. 260 Consequently, the DHHS terminated Forrisi's
employment. 261
Working under the first prong of the definition, the court
examined whether Forrisi's impairment constituted a significant barrier to employment. 262 The court listed three factors that were relevant
to this type of inquiry: "[T]he number and type of jobs from which
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which
the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations and training. "263 The court determined. that Forrisi did not
fall under the first prong of the definition because his particular
impairment prevented him from occupying only one position in his
place of employment. 264 The court stated that a substantial limitation
to working occurs when the employee's impairment generally forecloses the type of employment involved and not just one specific
position. 265
The court also rejected Forrisi's second argument that he was
perceived as having an impairment.266 The court stated that the DHHS
terminated Forrisi because he was. unable to perform the functions
of one single position and not because the DHHS considered Forrisi
to be handicapped. 261
The Rehabilitation Act decisions encompass a wide array of
conditions and impairments. Even more varied are the analyses
employed by the courts when deciding if a given individual satisfies
the definition of individual with handicaps .. One common thread,
however, ties all of these decisions together: Handicapping conditions
fall within one of two categories. The first category contains those
conditions, like mental retardation, Ahat either because of their severity or their effect, qualify a person as an individual with a
handicap. The second category encompasses those persons suffering

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
[d. at 933.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. (citing Jasany v. United States, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985».
[d. at 934.
[d. at 935.
[d. at 934.
[d. at 935.
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from other conditions that do not fit neatly within the Rehabilitation
Act's definition. In this group, each person suffering must individually demonstrate that he or she qualifies as an individual with
handicaps. As the decisions in this second category indicate, the
success of a claim often depends on how well the claimant has met
his or her burden of production. Unfortunately, relying upon Rehabilitation Act decisions in this second category to serve as the
benchmark for future ADA disability decisions proves problematic.
1993]

v.

ANALYSIS OF THE ADA DEFINITION

By examining the Rehabilitation Act decisions and the EEOC
regulations, a better understanding of the ADA definition of disability
can be gained. Organizationally, this section discusses each prong of
the ADA separately.

A. The First Prong: HA Physical or Mental Impairment that
Substantially Limits One or More oj the Major Life Activities oj
Such Individual"
1.

Physical Impairment

Several federal courts have found that an individual was physically impaired under the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act. 268
Examples of conditions which were determined to be physical impairments include blindness,269 deafness,270 mUltiple sclerosis,271 epilepsy,272 and dwarfism. 273 One can logically conclude, therefore, that
these same physical impairments would be found to meet the definition of disability under the ADA.
Conversely, some courts have determined that certain physical
conditions did not meet the definition of a handicapped individual
under the first prong. 274 In de la Torres, for example, the court
determined that left-handedness was "a physical characteristic, not
a chronic illness, a disorder or deformity, a mental disability, or a
condition affecting [the plaintiff's] health. "27S Nor has body weight
been considered a handicapping condition when it is self-imposed
and voluntary. 276
268.
269.
270.
27l.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra notes 37-43, 81-93, 156-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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The ADA's legislative history277 and its EEOC regulations 278
would render these prior decisions consistent with the ADA's definition of disability. The House Committee on the Judiciary states:
[A] physical or mental impairment means:
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic; skin, and endocrine.
Physical or· mental impairment does not include simple
physical characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair. 279
2.

Mental Impairment
Several courts have determined that various mental conditions
fall within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act.280 For example, in
New York University, a medical student who suffered from psychiatric and mental disorders, which caused her to commit self-destructive acts, was considered a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation
Act. 281 Individuals diagnosed with the following types of mental
conditions also met the definition of mental impairment: mental
retardation;282 schizoaffective reaction, which caused the individual
to become suicidal;283 depressive neurosis, which caused the individual
to be hospitalized several times;284 manic depression, which caused
the individual to suffer from emotional problems and whose behavior
was erratic;28S and paranoid schizophrenia, which caused the individual to be frequently hospitalized. 286
277. A physical or mental impairment means1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; ....
S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 22; see also H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II,
supra note II, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 333.
278. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g), 1630.3 (1993).
279. [d. § 1630.2; see also H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. III, supra note 11, at 28,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 451.
280. See supra notes 225-55 and accompanying text.
281. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
282. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
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These courts' interpretations of the term mental impairment are
also consistent with the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC
regulations. Both the House of Representatives Committee on the
JudiCiary Report and the EEOC regulations state that "mental impairment ... means ... any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities. "287
3.

Substantially Limits One or More of Life's Major Activities
The phrase "substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of an individual" was extensively scrutinized under the
Rehabilitation Act's case law. Some physical and mental impairments were found per se to limit substantially a major life activity. 288
Examples of these types of physical impairments include blindness,
the major life activity of seeing;289 deafness, the major life activity
of hearing;290 and AIDS, the major life activity of procreation and
intimate sexual relationships. 291
Other physical and mental impairments, however, had to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine the extent of the
limitation upon an individual's life. For example, in Arline, the
Supreme Court found that the physical impairment of tuberculosis
substantially limited the major life activity of breathing. 292 Back
problems causing extreme pain were determined to limit the major
life activities of working, walking, sitting, and standing, in Perez. 293
Conversely, other physical impairments were found not to limit
a major life activity. In Jasany, the court determined that the physical
impairment of crossed eyes did not substantially limit Jasany's life
because he was able to participate fully in "school, work, sports,
and recreational activities."294 In Oesterling, the court determined
that varicose veins, although a physical impairment, did not substantially limit Oesterling's life because the condition was diagnosed as
mild to moderate. 29s The court, therefore, concluded that th:e major
287. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(2); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, supra note 11, at 28,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 450.
288. See supra notes 133-35, 187-88, 223-24 and accompanying text .
. 289. See supra notes 134-35.
290. See supra note 133.
291. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 334; cj. Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F.
Supp. 1002, 1007 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that an elementary school student
with an AIDS-related complex was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act).
292. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
293. Perez v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
a/I'd, 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988).
294. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985).
295. Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985).
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life activities of standing and sitting were not substantially limited. 296
The ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations are
consistent with these courts' interpretations of this term under the
Rehabilitation Act. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources states the following:

A physical or mental impairment does not constitute a
disability under the first prong of the definition for purposes
of the ADA unless its severity is such that it results in a
"substantial limitation of one or more major life activities. "
A "major life activity" means functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 297
The EEOC regulations interpret the term substantially limits to
mean:
(1) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(2) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average person in the general
popUlation can perform that same major life activity. 298
The legislative history and the EEOC regulations would appear,
therefore, to validate the courts' conclusions in Arline, Jasany, Perez,
and Oesterling.
-

B.

The Second Prong: "A Record of Such Impairment"

Although fewer in number, the cases that have analyzed this
prong of the definition generally performed a more extensive analysis
than the cases under the first prong. Two of the three leading cases,
Arline and E. E. Black, examined their sets of facts against this
prong. In Arline, the Supreme Court determined that Arline had a
record of an impairment because she had been hospitalized for
tuberculosis. 299 Her medical history thus provided a sufficient record
to meet this prong. 3OO In E. E. Black, the plaintiff, Crosby, suffered
back injuries on the job. 301 After undergoing a medical pre-employment examination that revealed the back injuries, the defendant, E.
296. [d.

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 22 (emphasis added).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1993).
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
[d.
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 1980).

1993)

Defining "Disability" Under the ADA

385

E. Black, refused to hire Crosby.302 The court determined that Crosby
had a record (the physical examination) of a physical impairment
(back injuries) and that this record substantially limited his employment opportunities. 303
Other cases which have reached similar results include Mental
Health-Mental Retardation Commission, in which a record of a
mental impairment was one of the primary reasons behind the
employer's decision to terminate the claimant's employment,304 and
New York University, in which the court concluded that the claimant
should be classified as a handicapped person because of her extensive
history of mental impairments requiring hospitalizations. 30s
A contrary result was reached by the Pridemore court. In Pridemore, an applicant for an attorney position, who suffered from
cerebral palsy, was determined not to have a record of an impairment
because the cerebral palsy was diagnosed after his job interview. 306
Thus, Pridemore did not have a record of an impairment at the time
the employment decision was made. 307
The ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations are
consistent with the courts' interpretations of this term. The House
of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor reported:
The second prong of the definition of the term "disability"
includes an individual who has a record of such impairment,
i.e., an individual who has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment- that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.
This provision is included in the definition in part to
protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or
mental impairment which previously substantially limited
them in a major life activity. Discrimination on the basis
of such a past impairment would be prohibited under this
legislation. 308
The EEOC regulations state: "Has a record of such impairment
means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental

302. [d.
303. [d. at 1098.
304. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402,
1406-07 (5th Cir. 1983).
305. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
306. Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y, 625 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (S.D. Ohio
.
1985).
307. [d.
308. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. II, supra note 11, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 334.
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or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities. "309
Both the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations
would agree with the courts' interpretations of this term. This prong,
thus, intends to cover two types of individuals: (1) Those individuals
who are discriminated against because they have a record of an
impairment, such as individuals with histories of mental or emotional
illness; and (2) those individuals who have been misclassified as
having an impairment, such as an individual being falsely diagnosed
as mentally retarded. 3lD
C. The Third Prong: "Being Regarded as Having Such an
Impairment"
In many ways, this prong is the most difficult one to satisfy.
However, as E. E. Black, Thornhill, and New York University
demonstrate, proving a disability under this prong is possible. In
E.E. Black, Crosby, an apprentice carpenter, suffered back injuries. 311
He was subsequently permitted by an examining physician to return
to work.312 The contractor, however, refused to hire Crosby because
it perceived that Crosby's back injuries made him disabled.313 The
court determined that Crosby was an individual with handicaps under
the third prong of the definition because the contractor regarded
Crosby as impaired. 314
In Thornhill, the Army Corps of Engineers refused to hire the
plaintiff in spite of two physicians concluding that the plaintiff's
spinal deformity did not limit his lifting capacity.m The court held
that there were sufficient material facts to find that Thornhill was a
handicapped individual because of the Corps' perception that Thornhill's spinal deformity prevented him from performing his duties.316
In New York University, a medical student whose studies were
terminated because she suffered from psychiatric and mental disorders
was held to be a handicapped individual. 317 The court based its
reasoning upon "NYU's refusal to readmit her on the ground that
she pose[d] an unacceptable risk to faculty, students, and patients."318

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1993).
S. REp. No. 116, supra note 9, at 23.
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 1980).
[d. at 1091-92.
[d. at 1102.
[d.
Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
[d. at 1184.
Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
[d.
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Therefore, the court concluded that she was regarded as having an
impairment. 319
Both the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC regulations
would render these interpretations consistent with the statute. The
House Representatives Committee on the Judiciary states:
This test is intended to cover persons who are treated by a
covered entity as having a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity. It applies
whether or not a person has an impairment, if that person
was treated as if he or she had an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.320
The EEOC Regulations state the following:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes
of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs
(h)(I) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity
as having a substantially limiting impairment. 321
VI.

CONCLUSION
When deciding if a particular individual falls within the protection of the ADA, the courts will likely consider both the Rehabilitation Act decisions and the EEOC regulations. Although predicting
which disabilities will meet the ADA's definition is somewhat speculative, the courts will not likely try to reinvent the wheel. Therefore,
one would expect many of the same impairments that have met the
Rehabilitation AcCs definition to also meet the ADA's definition.
As the courts begin to create a comprehensive definition of disability,
one would hope that they keep in mind the overriding purpose of
the ADA and opt for a liberal construction. Inclusion is preferred
over exclusion, just as the elimination of discrimination is preferred
over its persistence.
Amalia Magdalena Villalba322

319. [d.
320. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, supra note II, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 452.
321. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1993).
322. This Comment is dedicated to my daughter, Heather, who taught me that a
deaf person can do anything except hear.

